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不同决策偏好下的供应链收益共享契约研究
供稿: 庞庆华;蒋晖;张保丰 时间: 2018-12-20 次数:

作者;庞庆华;蒋晖;张保丰

作者单位:河海大学商学院河海大学计算机与信息工程学院

摘要:收益共享契约是实现供应链系统绩效改善或完美协调的一种机制。考虑到零售商与供应商分别具有浪费与缺货厌恶决策偏好,在缺货与浪费厌恶决策偏好的情况下,建立随机需求下由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链的收益共享契约模型,并对模型进行了分析,揭示出供应商和零售商的决策偏好对最优订购量与供应链协作的影响。结果表明:在零售商与供应商具有不同的决策偏好时,只有双方的决策偏好系数满足一定函数关系时,收益共享契约才有可能使得供应链协调,且契约中的参数是双方决策偏好系数的增(减)函数。

基金:教育部人文社科基金项目(10YJC630188);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011B04814);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJD630006);河海大学科技创新基金项目(09B002-04);

关键词:供应链管理;收益共享契约;缺货厌恶;浪费厌恶;供应链协作;

DOI:10.16698/j.hpu(social.sciences).1673-9779.2012.04.016

分类号:F274;F224

Abstract:Revenue-Sharing (RS) contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain (SC) .Considering that supplier and retailer both has stockout-averse preferences, In this paper, the authors propose a model of an SC contract aimed at coordinating a two-stage SC which is based on revenue sharing mechanism and the customer's demand.Then, the authors explains how the decision bias of supplier and retailer influences the optimal order quantity and supply chain coordination by analyzing the model.The result shows: when retailer and supplier has different decision bias (waste-averse and stockout-averse) , only the coefficient of the SC members'decision bias satisfies some functions, can the SC coordinate based on RS contract, and the parameters of RS contract are increasing (decreasing) function of their decision bias coefficient.

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